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Abstract
We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large
number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small
number of the other players. The equilibrium concept ts well situations
where each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of
actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction.
We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the condi-
tions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although
his strength in the population is smaller than those of the right and left can-
didates.
JEL classication: C7, D72.
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1. Introduction
A strategic situation is characterized by the dependence of each player's
optimal action on his expectations of the other players' actions. Nash equi-
librium is the standard tool used to analyze such a situation. This concept
implicitly assumes that each player gets to know, by an unspecied process,
the equilibrium behavior of all other players and responds to it optimally.
In this paper, we study strategic situations in which each agent gets only
partial information about the other agents' actions prior to making a deci-
sion. We have in mind situations with a large number of players where each
player's interests depend on his own action and the distribution of actions
in the population. A player gets to know the actions of a sample of players,
treats the sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire
population, and responds optimally to this prediction. In this respect our
model belongs to the literature on bounded rationality and game theory.
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1One class of situations that ts this framework is elections. A voter often
bases his beliefs when he goes to the poll on information about the inten-
tions of only some of the other voters. In our model a voter participates in
an election when the information he gathers leads him to believe that his
vote will make a difference, and votes strategically when this information
leads him to believe that an insincere vote will inuence the outcome in the
direction of his favorite outcome.
Our main aim is to suggest a simple framework for discussing such situ-
ations. We wish to construct a model where players respond to the informa-
tion they get about the behavior of only some of the other players, without
specifying the information acquisition process. We do not want to allow a
player to consider the potential effect of his decision on other players' be-
havior. (In contrast, such considerations are central to herding models.)
Theconstruction of suchamodel isnot obvious becauseof thedifcultly,
well known in game theory, of distinguishing between two types of infor-
mation: hard information that a player perceives and soft information
that he deduces from his knowledge of the game and the assumption that
the players are rational. A simultaneous game, in which players must rely
on soft information about their opponents' moves does not t our goal be-
cause we want players to rely only on the hard information they gather.
An extensive game does not t our goal because it requires a specication
of the exact temporal order in which the players get the hard information,
something we want to avoid. Thus, we suggest a new model.
We assume that a player who gets information about the actions of a
sample of players considers it to represent the true distribution of actions in
the population. This assumption entails bounded rationality in the sense
that a player does not take into account the possibility that the randomness
of his sample makes his inference inaccurate. It conicts with what seems
to be a fact of life that the small sample of other voters to which a voter
has access is biased towards people with views similar to his own, but our
general framework could be modied to encompass such considerations.
We use an equilibrium approach. The sampling process is random, so
a player's optimal response is random. Our equilibrium concept requires
that the distribution of outcomes of this process be in a steady state, and
thus be equal to the distribution of actions in the population.
Our idea is rooted in our earlier paper Osborne and Rubinstein (1998),
in which we analyze an interactive situation in which each player samples
each of his available actions once, and on the basis of their performance
makes a choice, ignoring the fact that the realization of his sample is ran-
dom. In this paper, a player observes a sample of the other players' actions,
2constructs a belief about the distribution of actions in the population, and
responds optimally. In the earlier paper, he samples each of his actions,
constructs a mapping between his actions and outcomes, and responds op-
timally.
After dening the solution concept, we show that it exists. Then we ap-
ply it to a voting model where agents have single peaked preferences over
three candidates, a leftist, a centrist, and a rightist, and may vote strategi-
cally. This model is very simple relative to others in the literature, in that
players are not required to make complicated calculations. Yet it is quite
rich and allows us to address issues regarding strategic voting, like the con-
ditions under which a centrist is elected in a polarized society.
2. The Model and Solution Concept
Our model is hI,(qi)i2I, A,k,(Ri)i2Ii, with the following components.
 I is a nite set, the set of types.
 qi is the proportion type i in the population (qi  0, åi2I qi = 1).
 A is a nite set, the set of actions from which each agent can choose.
 k is a positive integer, the size of the sample that an individual takes
before choosing an action.
 Ri is a function that associates an action in A with each sample result
(na)a2A, where each na is a nonnegative integer (the number of players
in the sample who choose a) and åa2A na = k . The action Ri((na)a2A)
is player i's response to the observation that in his sample each action
a 2 A is chosen by na players.
A candidate for our solution concept is a prole of distributions of ac-
tions, one for each type. That is, it is a prole p = (pi)i2I, where pi 2 P(A)
for each i and P(A) is the set of distributions over A. Any prole p of dis-
tributions induces a random sample result s(p). An equilibrium is a prole
p such that for all i 2 I and all a 2 A the probability that Ri(s(p)) = a
is exactly pi(a). We call such an equilibrium a sampling equilibrium. The
following result follows trivially from Brouwer's xed point theorem.
Proposition 1 A sampling equilibrium exists.
33. A Model of Voting
We now use our model to study strategic voting. The usefulness of the stan-
dard models of voting using the notion of Nash equilibrium is limited be-
cause knowledge of the other voters' behavior makes a single individual's
vote irrelevant unless the vote totals of the top two candidates are equal or
almost equal; typically all outcomes can be supported by some equilibrium.
Our approach assumes that a voter has partial information about the
other voters' behavior that he acquires from a small random sample of the
population. A potential voter takes the real distribution of votes in the pop-
ulation to be the same as the distribution of votes in his sample, and on this
basis decides how to vote. He votes strategically if the sample reveals a tie
between two alternatives that do not include his favorite.
We assume that the size k of each voter's sample is 2 or 3. The assump-
tion of a larger size would make the analysis more difcult and would also
strain our assumption that an agent votes strategically only if his sample
indicates that he is exactly pivotal. Note that the fact that the sample taken
by a voter is private information makes our analysis very different from the
literature that analyzes elections with public polls.
In most of this section we consider a political environment with three
possible positions, L, M, and R, ordered naturally along a line. The popu-
lation contains three types of agents, L, M, and R, where agents of type X,
which we refer to as partisans of X, have single peaked preferences with
peak at X. We assume initially that agents of type M are indifferent between
L and R. We assume that the winner of the election is the candidate who
obtains the largest number of votes.
Many questions may be asked in this environment. Our main aim is to
demonstrate theusefulnessof themodelbystudying asingle issue: whether
the middle candidate wins, due to strategic voting by partisans of the other
candidates, even when he has fewer partisans than them.
Three candidates, no abstention, sample of two
First assume that each agent votes for one of the three positionsabstention
is not an option. Assume also that each agent samples two others (k = 2)
and that not all agents are of type M (qM < 1). The response functions are
dened as follows: an agent of type M always votes for M; an agent of type
L (R) votes (strategically) for M if one agent in his sample votes for M
and one votes for R (L), and otherwise votes for his favorite candidate.
4Claim 2 The model has a unique sampling equilibrium.
Proof. In an equilibrium, the probability pL(M) that a voter of type L votes
for M equals the probability that a voter obtains a sample containing one
agent who votes for R and one who votes for M. Only an agent of type R
votes for R, so the sample must contain an agent of type R who votes for R
and either (i) an agent of type L who votes for M, (ii) an agent of type M
(who votes for M), or (iii) an agent of type R who votes for M. Symmetric
considerations apply to pR(M). Thus for equilibrium we need
pL(M) = 2qRpR(R)[qLpL(M) + qM + qRpR(M)]
pR(M) = 2qLpL(L)[qRpR(M) + qM + qLpL(M)].
Using the fact that pR(R) = 1   pR(M) and pL(L) = 1   pL(M), and denot-
ing pL(M) = b and pR(M) = g, we have
b = 2(1   g)qRx (1)
g = 2(1   b)qLx (2)
x = gqR + qM + bqL. (3)
(The variable x is the share of the vote received by M.) Given qM < 1, these
equations have no solution in which x = 1. Given any x < 1, they have
at most one solution for b and g, so we need to show only that they have
a unique solution for x. For qR = qL = 1
2 the unique solution is x = 0,
and for qL = qR = 0 the unique solution is x = 1. Otherwise algebraic
calculations lead to H(x) = x   qM   4qLqR(x3   x2 + x) = 0. We have
H(0) < 0 and H(1) > 0 (because qL + qR > 4qLqR unless qL and qR are
either both 0 or both 1=2). We have also H0(x) = 1   4qLqR(3x2   2x + 1)
and H00(x) =  4qLqR(6x   2). Hence H is convex on [0, 1
3] and concave
on [1
3,1]. Thus if H(1
3) > 0 then there is a unique solution less than 1
3, if
H(1
3) = 0 then there is a unique solution equal to 1
3, and otherwise there is
a unique solution greater than 1
3.
Claim 3 In any equilibrium,
(a) not more than 50% of the partisans of L and R vote strategically
(b) if qR > qL then the proportion of partisans of L who vote strategically
exceeds the proportion of partisans of R who do so; qR > qL if and only if R gets
more votes than does L
(c) if qR  1
2 then R wins
(d) candidate M wins outright only if qM > 1
7, and if qL = qR loses if qM < 1
7.
5Proof. (a) All agents vote, so 1 = x + (1   b)qL + (1   g)qR and thus 2x(1  
x) = 2x(1   b)qL + 2x(1   g)qR = b + g (using (1) and (2)), which implies
b + g  1
2.
(b) By (1) and (2) we have b(1   b)=g(1   g) = qR=qL > 1. Now, by (a),
both b and g are less than 1
2, so that b(1   b) > g(1   g) implies b > g.
Given qR > qL, we thus have (1   g)qR > (1   b)qL.
(c) Assume that there is an equilibrium in which R does not win. Let
z = (1   g)qR, the proportion of the population that votes for R. Then by
(b), the proportion of votes for L is at most z, and candidate M wins. The
probability with which the partisans of R vote strategically is 1   z=qR 
1   2z. Now, the sum of the proportions of voters for L and for M is 1   z,
so the probability that a partisan of R obtains a sample with one voter for M
and one for L is at most twice the maximal value of xy where x + y = 1   z
and y  z, or 2z(1   2z). But 2z(1   2z) < 1   2z for z < 1
2, a contradiction.




3   qM   28
27qLqR and qLqR  1
4(1   qM)2. Thus candidate M
wins only if 1
3   qM   7
27(1   qM)2 > 0, which implies qM > 1
7. If qL = qR
and qM > 1
7 then H(1
3) > 0.
By part (b) of the result, if qR > qL then either R or M wins. Candidates
R and M tie if (1   g)qR = x, in which case the equilibrium conditions (1),
(2), and (3) imply that qR is equal to
h
2q2






L   16qL + 8
i
.
If qR is larger, R wins, otherwise M wins. The winning candidate, as a
function of qL and qR, is shown in Figure 1.
We have assumed so far that the partisans of M do not vote strategically.
We now assume that they are split into two equal sized types, ML, whose
preference puts M on top and L next, and MR, whose preference puts M on
top and R second. An agent of type ML who observes one vote for L and
one for R votes strategically for L. If qL = qR = q we obtain the following
conditions for a symmetric equilibrium, where b = pL(M) = pR(M) and 2d
is the proportion of the partisans of M who vote strategically (half for L and
half for R).
2d = 2[q(1   b) + (1   2q)d]2
b = 2[q(1   b) + (1   2q)d][2qb + (1   2q)(1   2d)]
It is easy to see that in an equilibrium the fraction of the population that
votes for M, namely 2qb + (1   2q)(1   2d), exceeds 1














Figure 1. The winning candidate as a function of qL and qR, the proportion of partisans of
L and R in the population. (The proportion of partisans of M is 1   qL   qR.)
or if the proportion of partisans of M is at least 20%. Thus, as expected, the
possibility that M's partisans vote strategically makes it more difcult for
M to win.
Two candidates, with abstention
So far, we have assumed that all agents are obliged to vote. We now assume
that each agent may abstain from voting, and votes only when he concludes
from his sample that his vote would make a difference, namely, whenever
there is a tie in his sample result.
For simplicity, we assume that there are only two candidates, L and R, so
that there is no room for strategic voting. We assume that each agent takes
a sample from all agents, including those who do not vote. (One could
analyze a variant of the model in which each agent's sample contains only
agents who vote; this might t the practice of poll takers to report only the
results within the group of likely voters.)
If the sample size is two (k = 2), an agent votes if and only if either
one sampled agent votes for A and one for B, or both sampled agents ab-
stain. Thus the fraction of partisans of A who vote is equal to the fraction of
partisans of B who vote, and this fraction v satises
v = 2qA(1   qA)v2 + (1   v)2,
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Figure 2. The participation rate as a function of qA for k = 2 and k = 3.
This rate is shown in Figure 2 as a function of qA. Greater polarization
of the population (qA close to 1
2) increases the participation rate, but only
moderately.
If k = 3, an agent votes if and only if his sample contains exactly two
opposing voters and one who abstains, or three abstaining voters. The equi-
librium condition is
v = 6qA(1   qA)v2(1   v) + (1   v)3.
The solution, shown in Figure 2, has the same general shape as the solu-
tion for k = 2, though the participation rate is smaller.
Can a middle candidate win without any partisans?
We now return to the case of three candidates L, M and R. Claim 3(c) shows
that without abstention andwith asample size2, the middlecandidate wins
only if the proportion of his partisans is at least 1
7. In other words, strategic
voting does not generate a centrist winner when the population is very po-
larized. We now show that when the society is totally polarized, a centrist
does not attract any votes in equilibrium.
Claim 4 If k = 2 and qM = 0 then there is no strategic voting in equilibrium,
whether or not agents can abstain.
Proof. For the case of no abstention, Claim 2 shows that there is a unique
equilibrium. It is trivial to verify that b = g = 0 is a solution of the equa-
tions characterizing this equilibrium.
For the case that agents can abstain, denote by x the fraction of votes for
M. A partisan of L votes for M if he gets a sample of one vote for M and one
8vote for R, which occurs with probability 2xqRpR(R). Similarly, a partisan
of R votes for M if he gets a sample of one vote for M and one vote for L.
Thus in a sampling equilibrium we need
x = qL(2xqRpR(R)) + qR(2xqLpL(L))
= 2xqLqR(pR(R) + pL(L)).
Now, qLqR  1
4 andthus 2qLqR(pR(R)+ pL(L)) < 1 unless pR(R) = pL(L) =
1. In both cases x = 0.
4. Concluding Comments
We suggest a framework for analyzing strategic situations in which each
player gets partial information about the behavior of the other players and
responds to this knowledge systematically. We use the framework to study
a simple election model, demonstrating that it can address questions that
are hard to discuss using conventional tools. We believe that the frame-
work is useful in many other contextsbut the only way to establish this
assertion is to carry out such analyses.
In the election model, a question on which we focus is that of whether
a compromise candidate can win in a society where agents are considering
voting strategically, even whentheproportion of his partisans is low. Weare
not aware of previous models addressing this issue. The work most closely
relatedis that of Myatt (2002), who studies astrategic voting model inwhich
an incumbent is disliked by the supporters of two minority parties. To de-
feat the incumbent, some supporters of one of the minority parties must
vote strategically for the other one. Voters get noisy information about the
outcome of an opinion poll, and behave rationally given this information.
The imperfect information leads to the emergence of a unique equilibrium
(in the spirit of the theory of global games), in which some votes are strate-
gic. A model less closely related is studied by McKelvey and Ordeshook
(1985), who assume that agents do not possess perfect information about
each others' votes, but collect information from sources like public polls,
and act rationally given this information.
Many extensions of our voting model are possible. We mention one di-
rection that we nd appealing. We assume specic response functions, un-
der which strategic voting is the outcome of a tie in the sample. An interest-
ing alternative is to assume that an agent votes for his preferred candidate
unless this candidate is the least popular according to his sample. If k = 2
9and there is no abstention then such a response function might yield an
equilibrium very different from the one we have found. Even in a totally
polarized society (in which the population is evenly split in supporting the
left and the right) and even for a large sample, in this case an equilibrium
exists where 1
3 of the agents vote for the center.
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